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The no-cloning property of quantum mechanics allows unforgeability of quantum banknotes and
credit cards. Quantum credit card protocols involve a bank, a client and a payment terminal, and
their practical implementation typically relies on encoding information on weak coherent states of
light. Here, we provide a security proof in this practical setting for semi-device-independent quantum
money with classical verification, involving an honest bank, a dishonest client and a potentially
untrusted terminal. Our analysis uses semidefinite programming in the coherent state framework
and aims at simultaneously optimizing over the noise and losses introduced by a dishonest party.
We discuss secure regimes of operation in both fixed and randomized phase settings, taking into
account experimental imperfections. Finally, we study the evolution of protocol security in the
presence of a decohering optical quantum memory and identify secure credit card lifetimes for a
specific configuration.
In contrast to classical physics, quantum mechanical
systems have a no-cloning property [1]: it is impossible to
make a perfect copy of a quantum object in an unknown
state. This property was used by Wiesner in his proposal
to mint unforgeable quantum money [2], giving birth to
the field of quantum cryptography [3–5]. The original
idea involved a bank encoding a secret classical key into
a sequence of two-level quantum states (qubits) stored in
a quantum memory and handed to a client. The secret
key specifies the basis in which each qubit is encoded,
ensuring that a forger ignoring the basis in which to
measure it will destroy information. This will then trigger
incorrect measurement outcomes when the bank will verify
the validity of the banknote. Such a scheme may be
impractical over long distances due to a potentially lossy
and noisy transmission of the quantum states between the
client and the bank. It was also shown to be vulnerable
to adaptive attacks, where a counterfeiter can use the
same banknote several times [6]. An alternative protocol
with verification using classical communication was first
proposed in [7] and extended to practical, noise-tolerant
schemes in [8–10].
Although quantum key distribution protocols have been
widely studied and implemented [11], quantum money
has not yet seen the same experimental progress, essen-
tially because of the difficulty in implementing efficient
quantum storage devices [12]. However, the experimen-
tal interest in quantum money has grown recently, with
demonstration of forgery of quantum banknotes [13] and
implementation of weak coherent state- based quantum
credit card schemes, secure in a trusted terminal scenario
[14, 15], in the prospect of near-future implementations
with a quantum memory. These require new security
proofs tackling the optimal cloning of coherent states,
differing from qubit-based quantum money and also quan-
tum key distribution proofs.
In quantum cryptography, semi-device-independent
frameworks have been developed in order to limit the
needed assumptions to ensure security. While not as
stringent as full device independence [16], this approach
allows for practical security and performance while mak-
ing fewer assumptions on the implementation than usual
security proofs. This includes assumptions on the detec-
tors [17–20], the dimensionality of the quantum states
[21–23] and other parameters [24]. For quantum money,
semi-device-independence relates to scenarios where one
does not trust the terminal, as in this work and [25, 26],
along with scenarios where the state preparation [25] or
the terminal is trusted but imperfectly characterized.
In this work, we derive a quantum money security proof
which incorporates semi-device-independence to deal with
both trusted and untrusted payment terminals in the
presence of experimental imperfections. We do so by ex-
tending the semidefinite programming (SDP) techniques
from [27–29] to the coherent state framework and using
the squashing model from [30, 31]. We also adapt our
proof to study the effect of a decohering quantum memory.
We remark that recent and concurrent work by Horodecki
and Stankiewicz [25] also studies semi-device-independent
quantum money, in a stronger threat model than here
(scenario (iv) of Table I), but without our focus on realistic
implementations.
I. PROTOCOL AND CORRECTNESS
We consider the qubit scheme introduced by Wies-
ner [2] in the classical verification setting of [7–10]. In
this three-party quantum money scheme, the mint gen-
erates a random secret classical key k(s) and encodes it
according to a secret classical basis key b(s). The quan-
tum credit card state associated to public serial num-
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2ber s is then written as |e(k,b)〉 = ⊗nj=1 |ψ(k,b)j 〉, where
|ψ(k,b)j 〉 ∈ {|+〉 , |+i〉 , |−〉 , |−i〉}. More specifically, bit
k
(s)
j is encoded in the σx basis when b
(s)
j = 0, and in the
σy basis when b(s)j = 1.
The mint stores |e(k,b)〉 in a quantum memory and
hands it to a client. When a transaction must be per-
formed, the merchant’s honest terminal measures each
of the n qubits of |e(k,b)〉 in a basis dictated by a chal-
lenge question randomly chosen by the bank. For a single
qubit state, the challenge c0 (resp. c1) reads: Give the
correct measurement outcome if the qubit is encoded in
the σx (resp. σy) basis, and provide any outcome if the
qubit is encoded in the σy (resp. σx) basis. The terminal
measures the qubit in the basis associated with the given
challenge, which provides the honest success probability
or correctness c = 1. The answers corresponding to the
measurement results are sent in the form of a classical bit
string to the bank, which compares it with k(s) and ac-
cepts the credit card only if all the measurement outcomes
coincide with k(s).
We now consider the same honest protocol in which
qubit states are mapped onto two-mode weak coherent
states as:
|0〉 → |α〉 ⊗ |vac〉 |1〉 → |vac〉 ⊗ |−α〉
|+〉 → | α√2 〉 ⊗ | α√2 〉 |−〉 → | α√2 〉 ⊗ |− α√2 〉
|+i〉 → | α√2 〉 ⊗ |i α√2 〉 |−i〉 → | α√2 〉 ⊗ |−i α√2 〉 ,
(1)
where α is the coherent state amplitude and |vac〉 denotes
the vacuum state. Such a mapping is typically used for
polarization or time-bin encoding, where the |0〉 compo-
nent is mapped onto the first mode and the |1〉 component
is mapped onto the second [32]. When dealing with po-
larization, the honest terminal measures each of the n
credit card states in the basis which answers either c0 or
c1 by typically rotating a half or quarter waveplate. It
then outputs (1 − fh)n measurement outcomes, where
fh ≈ e−ηdµ represents the honest losses assuming a weak
coherent light source with average photon number per
pulse µ = |α|2, unit channel transmission efficiency, and
threshold single-photon detectors with quantum efficiency
ηd. When no detection occurs, the terminal reports a
flag, denoted by ∅. For large sample sizes, the n-state
challenge is then satisfied only if the total number of
no-detection reports is equal to fhn. The multi-photon
component of coherent states may also trigger clicks on
both detectors at the same time. An adversary may actu-
ally exploit this property to boost his cheating probability.
Following the methods used in [30], clicks on both detec-
tors are randomly mapped to a single click as either a 0
or 1. This allows to use a squashing model to securely
map the infinite-dimensional threshold detection POVMs
to a finite dimensional Hilbert space.
Mint Client Terminal Bank Parameter
(i) H H H H correctness c
(ii) H D H H error rate e
(iii) H D/H D H error rate e
(iv) D D/H D H N/A
(v) D D/H D/H D N/A
TABLE I: Scenarios for quantum money with classical
verification in terms of honest (H) and dishonest (D)
parties. Cases denoted by D/H are indistinguishable to
the bank. In this work, (ii) is studied in a semi-device-
independent regime, since the squashing model allows to
strongly limit the assumptions on the terminal detectors,
while both (iii) and (iv) are by definition semi-device-
independent. Here, we do not study (iv), recently defined
and analyzed in [25], or the unrealistic scenario (v).
II. SECURITY
A. Principle and proof outline
Table I shows the possible security scenarios for quan-
tum money schemes. A successful forging attack consists
in answering two challenges correctly at the same time,
corresponding to extracting twice the original amount of
money in one’s possession. As the last four states from
Eq. (1) are identical on the first mode, we may reduce our
security analysis to the single state |αk〉 = |ik α√2 〉 with
k 6 3, before extending it to n states. In scenario (ii),
an attack is materialized by the creation of two copies of
the quantum credit card state, both being accepted by
the bank when measured by two separate trusted termi-
nals. In scenario (iii), an attack is materialized by the
communication of two classical strings by two untrusted
terminals to the bank, which accepts both of them. In a
coherent state implementation, the adversary may modify
one or both of the following parameters: losses fd (proba-
bility of a projection onto the vacuum state), and error
rate e. The bank may detect an attack when fd > fh or
when the measured error rate e upon verification is larger
than expected. Given average photon number µ, we use
SDP techniques [28, 29] to first minimize the losses that
the adversary must introduce in (ii) or declare in (iii) to
succeed with probability (1 − e). We can then identify
the range of µ for which fd > fh. We will use Choi’s the-
orem (see Appendix A.1 for details) to optimize over the
best adversarial linear cloning map. For (ii), the figure
of merit for the optimization is based on the measure-
ments of the two trusted terminals. For (iii), the figure
of merit becomes the acceptance of classical data by the
3bank. We then show how this single state analysis gives
a bound for the n-state proof. We also note the following
useful property from [27], proven in Appendix A.2: given
|ψ1〉 ∈ Hd1, |ψ3〉 ∈ Hd
′
3 , and Choi–Jamiołkowski operator
J(Λ) associated to map Λ, we have
〈ψ3|Λ(|ψ1〉 〈ψ1|) |ψ3〉 = 〈ψ3|⊗〈ψ1| J(Λ) |ψ3〉⊗|ψ1〉 , (2)
where the overline denotes complex conjugation.
B. Trusted terminal
We shall first study the trusted terminal scenario (ii).
In the single qubit case, the minimum adversarial error
probability is the same as in Wiesner’s original quantum
verification scheme, namely e = 1/4 [2, 27]. When deal-
ing with the coherent states from Eq. (1), we use the
existence of a squashing model for our threshold detec-
tor measurement setup, originally proven for coherent
implementations of BB84 [30]. By imposing a condition
on the terminal’s postprocessing, consisting of assign-
ing a random measurement outcome to any double click,
this model allows to express the infinite-dimensional mea-
surement operators in a 3-dimensional space spanned
by {|0〉 , |1〉 , |∅〉}, which greatly simplifies the security
analysis. Let Λ be the optimal adversarial map which
produces two copies (living in H1 ⊗ H2) of the origi-
nal quantum credit card state ρmint = 14
∑3
k=0 |αk〉 〈αk|
(living in Hmint). The state ρmint may be expressed
in a 4-dimensional orthonormal basis corresponding to
span{|αk〉}, as shown in Appendix B.1. The probability
that a trusted terminal declares an incorrect measure-
ment outcome for credit card 1 (resp. 2) is given by the
trace of
∑3
k=0
( 1
2 |β⊥k 〉 〈β⊥k | ⊗ 1
)
Λ( 14 |αk〉 〈αk|), (resp. of∑3
k=0
(
1⊗ 12 |β⊥k 〉 〈β⊥k |
)
Λ( 14 |αk〉 〈αk|), where |βk〉 is the
squashed qubit associated with the original state |αk〉, i.e.
|β0〉 = |+〉, |β1〉 = |+i〉, |β2〉 = |−〉, |β3〉 = |−i〉, and |β⊥k 〉
is its orthogonal qubit state. The factor 1/4 indicates that
each |αk〉 is equally likely to occur, while 1/2 accounts for
the trusted terminal’s random measurement basis choice.
Using Eq. (2), we may then rewrite these expressions
as Tr (E1(µ)J(Λ)) and Tr (E2(µ)J(Λ)), where E1(µ) and
E2(µ) are the error operators,
E1(µ) =
1
4
3∑
k=0
1
2 |β
⊥
k 〉 〈β⊥k | ⊗ 1⊗ |αk〉 〈αk|
E2(µ) =
1
4
3∑
k=0
1⊗ 12 |β
⊥
k 〉 〈β⊥k | ⊗ |αk〉 〈αk| ,
(3)
and µ = |α|2 is the average photon number in a pulse.
Following a similar method, the probability that terminal
1 (resp. 2) registers a no-detection event on credit card
1 (resp. 2) reads Tr (L1(µ)J(Λ)) (resp. Tr (L2(µ)J(Λ))),
where L1(µ) and L2(µ) are the loss operators, which
contain the projection onto the state |∅〉:
L1(µ) =
1
4
3∑
k=0
|∅〉 〈∅| ⊗ 1⊗ |αk〉 〈αk|
L2(µ) =
1
4
3∑
k=0
1⊗ |∅〉 〈∅| ⊗ |αk〉 〈αk| .
(4)
We now search for the optimal cloning map Λ that min-
imizes the losses that the adversary must introduce on
both credit cards for a given error rate e. We cast this
problem in the following SDP for a card with a single
state,
min Tr (L1(µ)J(Λ))
s.t. TrH1⊗H2 (J(Λ)) = 1Hmint
Tr (E1(µ)J(Λ)) = e
Tr (E1(µ)J(Λ)) > Tr (E2(µ)J(Λ))
Tr (L1(µ)J(Λ)) > Tr (L2(µ)J(Λ))
J(Λ) > 0.
(5)
The first constraint imposes that Λ is trace-preserving,
the second imposes error e when card 1 is measured by
terminal 1, the third and fourth impose that the error
and losses on card 1 are at least equal to those on card
2, and the fifth imposes that Λ is completely positive.
Solving (5) numerically provides the results in Fig. 1a:
it is impossible for an adversary to succeed with zero
error (e = 0%) without introducing any excess losses
(fd > fh) when µ < 1.7. The protocol may therefore be
implemented securely in this range of µ, since the excess
losses will allow the bank to detect an attack. Secure
regions of operation for other values of error e are also
displayed in Fig. 1a.
In Appendix C, we extend problem (5) to n states and
provide numerical evidence that the optimal solution does
not change in this case, namely the adversary cannot
decrease fd by correlating the n states.
C. Untrusted terminal
In the untrusted terminal scenario (iii), the adversary
aims to provide two classical outcome strings from two
different untrusted terminals which are both accepted by
the bank. The minimum error in the qubit case yields
e = 1/8 [27] (attained with the strategy provided in
Appendix D). In the coherent state framework, we recast
4(a) Trusted, fixed phase, ηd = 100% (b) Untrusted, fixed phase, ηd = 100%
(c) Trusted, randomized phase, ηd = 100% (d) Untrusted, randomized phase, ηd = 100%
(e) Trusted, randomized phase, ηd < 100% (f) Untrusted, randomized phase, ηd < 100%
FIG. 1: Optimal numerical solutions of problem (5) as a function of average photon number µ for different values of
error rate e and detection efficiency ηd, for both trusted and untrusted terminals. Solid lines correspond to the honest
losses fh = e−ηdµ. Points indicate the losses fd that a dishonest party must induce in order to succeed with error e.
Graphs are plotted from top to bottom following the order of the legend. The protocol is secure in regions where
fd > fh. We used the SDPT3 solver [33, 34] of the CVX [35, 36] software.
(5) with newly defined error and loss operators:
E1(µ) =
1
16
1∑
i,j=0
∑
k∈{i,i+2}
|a⊥ik〉 〈a⊥ik| ⊗ 1
⊗ |ci, cj , αk〉 〈ci, cj , αk|
L1(µ) =
1
16
1∑
i,j=0
3∑
k=0
|∅〉 〈∅| ⊗ 1
⊗ |ci, cj , αk〉 〈ci, cj , αk| ,
(6)
and similarly for E2(µ) and L2(µ). We use braket notation
to denote the correct classical answer |aik〉 to challenge
|ci〉, given state |αk〉. These vectors are all orthogonal to
one another, and live in a 3-dimensional space spanned by
classical answers {|a0〉 , |a1〉 , |∅〉}, where the last vector
corresponds to a classical no-detection flag. We label the
orthogonal (wrong) answer as |a⊥ik〉. Figure 1b displays the
optimal solutions as a function of µ: an errorless protocol
is impossible without increasing the fraction of declared
no-detection flags with respect to the honest fraction fh,
although this increase is extremely small compared to the
5trusted terminal setting (see figure inset).
III. PARAMETER ANALYSIS
The small adversarial losses and tight noise tolerance
observed in Fig. 1b may be increased by replacing the
pure states {|αk〉} (given in Appendix B.1) with phase-
randomized states ρk (expressions given in Appendix B.2).
Phase randomization is commonly used in quantum key
distribution implementations to increase the security and
obtain higher key rates [37–39]. Numerical solutions to
(5) for such states are displayed in Figs. 1c and 1d for
trusted and untrusted terminals respectively. We observe
that the range of µ for which security can be shown in
practice is considerably extended in this case.
It is also interesting to analyze our results in this phase-
randomized setting for finite detection efficiency ηd. Fig-
ures 1e and 1f show that security may be achieved in
the trusted terminal scenario using state-of-the-art single-
photon detectors [40, 41], depending also on the target
error rate, while the untrusted scenario puts much more
stringent constraints on the required devices.
We also remark that in Appendix E, we provide an
alternative SDP to (5) which allows to derive e given a
fixed µ and detection efficiency ηd.
IV. DECOHERING QUANTUM MEMORY
In our security analysis, we have considered up till now
fixed losses. However, in a quantum money implemen-
tation with a quantum memory used to store the credit
card states, it will be necessary to take into account the
time-dependent losses due to the decoherence of the mem-
ory. Here, the mint hands the stored quantum state to
the client at time t = 0. When t > 0, the retrieval ef-
ficiency ηm(t) decreases with time, thus increasing the
losses to e−µηdηm(t). The initial retrieval efficiency ηm(0)
of the quantum memory limits the fraction of the n states
a dishonest client can retrieve to
(
1− e−µηdηm(0)). He
may however have access to an ideal quantum memory to
transfer the state at t = 0, before ηm(t) starts to decrease.
This opens the door to powerful loss dependent attacks
whose success increases as a function of time. As an il-
lustration, we consider the cold atomic ensemble setup
described in [42], with losses that are dominated by the de-
phasing of the collective atomic magnetic excitation with
a lifetime τ ≈ 15µs due to weak residual magnetic fields.
The retrieval efficiency decreases as ηm(t) ≈ ηm(0)e−t2/τ2 ,
where ηm(0) ≈ 68% for this setup. Using this expression,
we solve (5) with phase-randomized states and derive
secure credit card lifetimes of a few µs, as shown in Fig.
2 for µ = 0.50 and µ = 1.50.
(a) µ = 0.50
(b) µ = 1.50
FIG. 2: Losses using phase-randomized states as a func-
tion of time t. The solid lines indicate fh for two values of
µ = 0.50 (a) and µ = 1.50 (b), with parameters ηm = 68%
and ηd = 100%, 95% and 80% from bottom to top. Sym-
bols indicate the losses fd induced by the adversary to
succeed with error rate e = 0 or 1%. The protocol is
secure as long as the solid line lies below the symbols.
CONCLUSION
By establishing an optimization framework in the co-
herent state setting, we have derived secure regions of
operation for quantum credit card schemes in both trusted
and untrusted terminal scenarios. With phase-randomized
states, we have shown that the former case can be secure
using a setup with detection efficiency ηd > 80% and noise
tolerance around e = 1−2%, while the latter case requires
tighter parameters: ηd > 95% and noise tolerance lower
than e = 1%. Using the duality of semidefinite programs,
we have provided numerical evidence that the adversary
cannot increase his/her cheating probability by correlat-
ing the n states in the credit card. In such a setting, the
uncertainty on the tolerated number of incorrect outcomes
en and excess losses fd n scales as
√
n. We have finally
provided a method to derive secure credit card lifetimes
in the presence of a decohering quantum memory. This
work encourages the future implementation of quantum
credit card schemes with state-of-the-art quantum storage
devices, as it provides a simple framework to derive prac-
6tical security parameters in a semi-device-independent
setting.
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APPENDIX A : CHOI–JAMIOŁKOWSKI
OPERATOR AND SEMIDEFINITE
PROGRAMMING.
A.1 : Choi’s theorem on completely positive maps
Let us consider a tensor product of two d-dimensional
Hilbert spaces H = Hd1 ⊗Hd2, and then define the maxi-
mally entangled state |Φ+〉 〈Φ+| on H as
|Φ+〉 〈Φ+| = 1
d
d∑
i,j=1
|i〉 〈j| ⊗ |i〉 〈j|
We introduce a completely positive linear map Λ : Hd1 →
Hd′3 , and define the Choi–Jamiołkowski operator J(Λ) :
Hd1 ⊗Hd2 → Hd
′
3 ⊗Hd2 as the operator which applies Λ to
the first half of the maximally entangled state |Φ+〉 〈Φ+|:
J(Λ) = 1
d
d∑
i,j=1
Λ(|i〉 〈j|)⊗ |i〉 〈j| .
Choi’s theorem then states that Λ is completely posi-
tive if and only iff J(Λ) is positive semidefinite. We
also have that Λ is a trace-preserving map if and only if
TrHd′3 (J(Λ)) = 1Hd2 [27–29]. These properties are imple-
mented as constraints in the optimization problem from
(5).
A.2 : Proof of Equation (2)
For a completely positive trace-preserving linear map
Λ : Hd1 → Hd
′
3 and its associated Choi–Jamiołkowski
operator J(Λ), and |ψ1〉 ∈ Hd1, |ψ3〉 ∈ Hd
′
3 , we can write
〈ψ3| ⊗ 〈ψ1| J(Λ) |ψ3〉 ⊗ |ψ1〉
= 〈ψ3| ⊗ 〈ψ1|
 d∑
i,j=1
Λ(|i〉 〈j|)⊗ |i〉 〈j|
 |ψ3〉 ⊗ |ψ1〉
=
d∑
i,j=1
〈ψ3|Λ(|i〉 〈j|) |ψ3〉 ⊗ 〈ψ1|i〉 〈j|ψ1〉
=
d∑
i,j=1
〈ψ3|Λ(|i〉 〈j|) |ψ3〉 ⊗ 〈i|ψ1〉 〈ψ1|j〉
=
d∑
i,j=1
〈ψ3|Λ(ψ1,ij |i〉 〈j|) |ψ3〉
= 〈ψ3|Λ(|ψ1〉 〈ψ1|) |ψ3〉 ,
where we have defined the scalar ψ1,ij := 〈i|ψ1〉 〈ψ1|j〉.
APPENDIX B : NON PHASE-RANDOMIZED
AND PHASE-RANDOMIZED COHERENT
STATE EXPRESSIONS.
B.1 : Non phase-randomized states
We may write the coherent states |αk〉 = |ik α√2 〉 from
Hmint in a four-dimensional orthonormal basis {|φi〉} as
|α0〉 = C0 |φ0〉+ C1 |φ1〉+C2 |φ2〉+ C3 |φ3〉
|α1〉 = C0 |φ0〉+ iC1 |φ1〉−C2 |φ2〉 − iC3 |φ3〉
|α2〉 = C0 |φ0〉− C1 |φ1〉+C2 |φ2〉− C3 |φ3〉
|α3〉 = C0 |φ0〉 − iC1 |φ1〉−C2 |φ2〉+ iC3 |φ3〉
where
C0 =
e−
|α|2
4√
2
√
cosh α
2
2 + cos
α2
2
C1 =
e−
|α|2
4√
2
√
sinh α
2
2 + sin
α2
2
C2 =
e−
|α|2
4√
2
√
cosh α
2
2 − cos
α2
2
C3 =
e−
|α|2
4√
2
√
sinh α
2
2 − sin
α2
2
B.2 : Phase-randomized states
We may express the four states in our protocol as:∣∣∣∣eiφ α√2
〉
⊗
∣∣∣∣ei(φ+θ) α√2
〉
,
with global phase φ = 0 and relative phase θ ∈
{0, pi2 , 2pi, 3pi2 }. This implies that an adversary must access
θ to unveil the information encoded in the states. Phase
randomization scrambles the global phase reference by
allowing φ to take values from [0, 2pi] uniformly at random
instead of a single value. By considering the state |eiφα〉
and integrating over all possible values of φ, the adversary
sees a classical mixture of Fock states given by [37]:
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
|√µeiφ〉 〈√µeiφ| dφ = e−µ
∞∑
n=0
µn
n! |n〉 〈n| ,
where µ = |α|2 is the average photon number, and |n〉
are the photon number states. As the coherent superpo-
sitions of number states vanish, the security proof may
simply proceed according to the result of quantum non
demolition (QND) photon number measurements. If there
is no photon in the state, then there is no information.
If there is 1 photon, then the qubit security proof may
be applied. If there are more than 2 photons in the
pulse, perfect cheating is possible, since one photon can
8be sent to a terminal 1 and another to terminal 2. For
our protocol, this allows us to express the phase ran-
domized states ρk in a 7-dimensional orthonormal basis
{|v〉 , |q0〉 , |q1〉 , |m0〉 , |m1〉 , |m2〉 , |m3〉}, where |v〉 is the
vacuum state, |q0〉 and |q1〉 span a qubit space, and |mi〉
constitute the four orthogonal outcomes which materialize
the four perfectly distinguishable states in the multipho-
ton subspace. Our four phase-randomized coherent states
may then be written as the following density matrices :
ρ0 = p0(µ)|v〉〈v|+ p1(µ)|+〉〈+|+ pm(µ)|m0〉〈m0|
ρ1 = p0(µ)|v〉〈v|+p1(µ)|+ i〉〈+i|+ pm(µ)|m1〉〈m1|
ρ2 = p0(µ)|v〉〈v|+ p1(µ)|−〉〈−|+ pm(µ)|m2〉〈m2|
ρ3 = p0(µ)|v〉〈v|+p1(µ)| − i〉〈−i|+ pm(µ)|m3〉〈m3|,
where |+〉,|+i〉, |−〉, |−i〉 are the usual σx and σy eigen-
states in the qubit space spanned by |qi〉 and the Poisson
distribution coefficients are given by
p0(µ) = e−µ, p1(µ) = µe−µ, pm(µ) = 1− (1 + µ)e−µ.
APPENDIX C : EXTENSION OF SDP (5) TO n
PARALLEL REPETITIONS.
Semidefinite programming presents a dual structure,
which associates a dual maximization problem to each
primal minimization problem [28, 29]. The optimal value
of the primal problem then upper bounds the optimal
value of the dual problem, and the optimal value of the
dual problem lower bounds that of the primal problem.
This property is known as weak duality. We also note
that a single problem may admit several feasible solutions,
i.e., operators which satisfy all the constraints. The
optimal solution is the feasible solution which optimizes
the objective function (the quantity we aim to minimize
or maximize). In our setting, SDP (5) may be labelled
as the primal problem. The aim of this section is to
extend SDP (5) to a credit card containing n states, and
to derive its corresponding dual problem. In order to
show that the adversary does not gain any advantage in
correlating the n states to better succeed, we will first
show that a tensor product of n optimal solutions of (5)
is a feasible solution to this new primal SDP. We then
have to show that there also exists a feasible solution
for the associated dual problem which yields the same
optimal value as that of the primal. Such a feature is
known as strong duality, and implies that these feasible
solutions are both the optimal solutions to the primal
and dual problem, respectively. We failed to prove this
strong duality analytically, but as shown below, numerical
evidence indicate it should hold.
To generalize the loss and error operators to the n par-
allel repetition case, we introduce the projector P(n, j, C)
which, given a collection C of n quantum states living in
Hilbert space H(n), projects onto j 6 n elements of C and
the orthogonal subspace of the (n − j) other elements.
More formally, this operator is defined as
P(n, j, C) =
∑
s(j)
n−1⊗
i=0
[
si(j)Ci + si(j)(1− Ci)
]
,
where Ci is the i-th quantum state of C and si(j) is the
i-th element of a binary string s(j) of length n which
contains (n− j) zeros. The summation then runs over all(
n
j
)
possible s(j) strings. Considering a new adversarial
cloning map Λ(n) from the original n-state credit card
living in H(n)mint to a duplicated credit card space H(n)1 ⊗
H(n)2 , the new loss operators may then be written as:
L
(n)
1 (µ) =
1
4n
n∑
j=1
3∑
k1···kn=0
j
nP
(
n, j, C(∅,n)
)
⊗ 1H(n)2
⊗ (|αk1〉 〈αk1 | ⊗ · · · ⊗ |αkn〉 〈αkn |)
L
(n)
2 (µ) =
1
4n
n∑
j=1
3∑
k1···kn=0
1H(n)1
⊗ jnP
(
n, j, C(∅,n)
)
⊗ (|αk1〉 〈αk1 | ⊗ · · · ⊗ |αkn〉 〈αkn |) ,
where C(∅,n) = {|∅〉 〈∅|}n. The factors jn ensure that the
total sum is normalized, as we are dealing with probabili-
ties and not events. The new error operators read:
E
(n)
1 (µ) =
1
4n
n∑
j=1
3∑
k1···kn=0
j
nP
(
n, j, C(k1,.,kn)
)
⊗ 1H(n)2
⊗ (|αk1〉 〈αk1 | ⊗ · · · ⊗ |αkn〉 〈αkn |)
E
(n)
2 (µ) =
1
4n
n∑
j=1
3∑
k1···kn=0
1H(n)1
⊗ jnP
(
n, j, C(k1,.,kn)
)
⊗ (|αk1〉 〈αk1 | ⊗ · · · ⊗ |αkn〉 〈αkn |) ,
where C(k1,...,kn) = { 12 |β⊥k1〉 〈β⊥k1 | , . . . , 12 |β⊥kn〉 〈β⊥kn |}. For
a credit card containing n states, problem (5) may then
be recast as:
min Tr
(
L
(n)
1 (µ)J(Λ(n))
)
s.t.TrH(n)1 ⊗H(n)2
(
J(Λ(n))
)
= 1H(n)mint
Tr
(
E
(n)
1 (µ)J(Λ(n))
)
= e
Tr
(
E
(n)
1 (µ)J(Λ(n))
)
> Tr
(
E
(n)
2 (µ)J(Λ(n))
)
Tr
(
L
(n)
1 (µ)J(Λ(n))
)
> Tr
(
L
(n)
2 (µ)J(Λ(n))
)
J(Λ(n)) > 0
(7)
To derive the dual problem associated with (7), we first
note that we can replace all inequalities by equalities
(except the last semidefinite positive constraint) with-
out loss of generality. This is due to the fact that the
adversary can always symmetrize the probabilities by
9e 10−6 10−3 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10
µ 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.50 1.00 2.00
TABLE II: Numerical solutions of the dual problem (9)
were found for all possible combinations of the above e
and µ values, using the SDPT3 solver from the CVX soft-
ware with its default numerical precision (10−9). These
solutions obeyed the constraints (10) within numerical
accuracy and all present a duality gap of order 10−9. We
note that, when e < 10−6, the solver struggles to find an
accurate solution for some low values of µ, as it fails to
decrease the duality gap to less than 10−7. The inaccu-
rate optimal dual solutions are nevertheless close to the
accurate primal optimal solutions within 10−4.
increasing the error rate or losses on card 2 to make
them equal to those on card 1. The right hand side
elements of the constraints from (7) may then be gath-
ered in a (42n + 3)-dimensional column vector ~b(n). The
first three elements read (e, e, 0), and correspond to the
value of Tr
(
E
(n)
1 (µ)J(Λ(n))
)
, Tr
(
E
(n)
2 (µ)J(Λ(n))
)
and
Tr
((
L
(n)
1 (µ)− L(n)2 (µ)
)
J(Λ(n))
)
, respectively. The 42n
other elements, corresponding to the first, trace-preserving
constraint of (7), may be written as the vector represen-
tation of the identity over space H(n)mint. The vector rep-
resentation vec(O) of an operator O is obtained through
the following isomorphism [43] :
d∑
ij=1
Oij |i〉 〈j| →
d∑
ij=1
Oij |i〉 ⊗ |j〉 (8)
The dual problem then maximizes the overlap of vari-
able ~d(n) with constraint vector ~b(n) as:
max~b(n)T ~d(n)
s.t. d(n)1 E
(n)
1 (µ) + d
(n)
2 E
(n)
2 (µ)
+ d(n)3
(
L
(n)
1 (µ)− L(n)2 (µ)
)
+ 1H(n)1 ⊗H(n)2 ⊗D
(n) − L(n)1 (µ) 6 0,
(9)
where D(n) is a 4n × 4n matrix containing the ele-
ments d(n)4 to d
(n)
42n+3 arranged in order left to right, top
to bottom. The objective function reads ~b(n)T ~d(n) =
ed
(n)
1 + ed
(n)
2 + Tr(D(n)). We note that a tensor product
of optimal solutions J(Λ(n)) =
⊗n
j=1 J(Λ) represents a
feasible solution to primal problem (7), as it satisfies all
the constraints. We label the associated primal objective
function value as s(n)p , and remark that s(n)p = s(1)p = fd
for all n. We then search for a feasible solution ~d(n) to
the dual problem (9) which allows to achieve s(n)p = s(n)d ,
where s(n)d is the dual objective function value. While we
were not able to find a generic analytical solution to this
problem, we have always found a numerical solution ~d(n)
for a representative set of parameters µ and e (specified
in Table II), satisfying
d
(n)
1 , d
(n)
2 < 0 D
(n)
ij = 0 for i 6= j
d
(n)
3 = 0.5 Tr(D(n)) = s(n)p − (d(n)1 + d(n)2 )e,
(10)
and presenting a duality gap of order 10−9. Furthermore,
adding the last condition as constraint to the SDP does
not change the optimal value (within 10−4 error, due to
the fact the the value of s(n)p is a numerical primal optimal
value which is rounded up when added as a constraint
in the dual problem). The conditions on d(n)1 , d
(n)
2 , d
(n)
3
enforce the following expression of the dual constraint:
−
∣∣∣d(n)1 ∣∣∣E(n)1 (µ)− ∣∣∣d(n)2 ∣∣∣E(n)2 (µ)− 12L(n)1 (µ)
− 12L(n)2 (µ) + 1H(n)1 ⊗H(n)2 ⊗D
(n) 6 0 (11)
Since the error and loss operators are all positive semidefi-
nite, then it follows that the sum of the first four terms in
(11) is a negative semidefinite operator. Numerically, it
appears to be possible to satisfy (11) by choosing appro-
priately the diagonal elements of D(n), and we conjecture
it is always possible.
In conclusion, we have found two feasible solutions such
that s(n)p = s(n)d , and strong duality holds for problems (7)
and (9), at least up to numerical precision. The optimal
solution to the primal problem for n states can therefore
be written as a tensor product of optimal solutions to the
primal problem for n = 1 state. This implies that the
adversary does not gain any advantage in correlating the
states in the card when performing an attack against a
trusted terminal without phase randomization. A similar
approach works to prove strong duality for the untrusted
terminal case, and we conjecture that this method also
works for both scenarios with phase-randomized states.
APPENDIX D : OPTIMAL ADVERSARIAL
STRATEGY WITH QUBITS IN AN UNTRUSTED
TERMINAL SCENARIO.
A simple strategy corresponding to the error rate e =
1/8 for a state encoded in the basis b is :
ci = cj: Adopt the honest strategy and duplicate the clas-
sical outcome.
Success probability: 1
ci 6= cj: Pick a basis b (or b) at random, measure the
state in this basis, and send the classical outcome
to answer challenge cb (or cb). Send a random
measurement outcome to the other challenge cb (or
cb). If the correct basis b was picked, then the
10
adversary succeeds with probability 1. If the wrong
basis b was picked, then the success probability is
1
2 .
Success probability : 12 × 1 + 12 × 12 = 34 .
Since the bank will ask each of these challenge combina-
tions with probability 12 , then we have a total success
probability 78 , which yields e =
1
8 .
APPENDIX E : OPTIMAL ERROR RATE
If one wishes to minimize the error rate given a fixed
honest loss rate, then one may cast the following SDP,
which has a similar structure to (5) :
min Tr (E1(µ)J(Λ))
s.t. TrH1⊗H2 (J(Λ)) = 1Hmint
Tr (E1(µ)J(Λ)) > Tr (E2(µ)J(Λ)) (12)
Tr (L1(µ)J(Λ)) 6 e−ηdµ
Tr (L2(µ)J(Λ)) 6 e−ηdµ
J(Λ) > 0
The first constraint imposes that Λ is trace-preserving,
the second imposes that the error on card 1 is greater
or equal to that on card 2, the third and fourth impose
that the losses on each card are smaller or equal to the
honest expected losses fh, and the fifth imposes that Λ
is completely positive. Tables III give optimal numerical
solutions to (12) for different scenarios, varying the phase-
randomization, detection efficiencies, terminal trust, losses
and average photon number µ.
µ e, trusted e, untrusted fh
Non phase-randomized, ηd = 100%
0.05 0.1% 0.1% 95.1%
0.10 0.3% 0.1% 90.5%
0.15 0.4% 0.1% 86.1%
0.25 0.5% 0 % 77.9%
0.55 0.7% 0 % 57.7%
Phase-randomized, ηd = 100%
0.50 2.2% 1.1% 60.1%
0.75 2.6% 1.3% 47.2%
1.00 2.7% 1.3% 36.8%
1.25 2.6% 1.3% 28.7%
1.50 2.4% 1.2% 22.3%
Phase-randomized, ηd = 80%
0.40 1.1% 0.2% 72.6%
0.60 1.4% 0.2% 61.9%
0.80 1.5% 0.2% 52.7%
1.00 1.5% 0.1% 44.9%
1.20 1.5% 0.1% 38.3%
TABLE III: Optimal numerical solutions to (12) in
various scenarios.
